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:
MARGARET F. BRINIG
University of Iowa, College of Law

This paper examines a particular type of contracts: the agreements produced by divorcing couples.
Virtually required by many states, they are, in theory at least, closely monitored by courts since, when
children are involved, they will be incorporated into court orders. The parties to these unhappy contracts
are attempting to minimize losses, rather than maximize gain. How are contracts structured that will
do this, and how does a difference in the size or power of the bargaining entities change the final
settlement or contracting result? This empirical study not only considers how the contractual terms come
to be, but also what effect they have over a five-year period, with an eye to seeing which contracts
produce (or are at least consistent with) further litigation, and which correspond with adjustment over
time. The role of lawyers in the entire process is also a focus of the inquiry. Special attention is paid to
the role of fault, with surprising results in a no-fault system. All divorce stipulations for parents of
minor children filed in Johnson County, Iowa, during 1998 provide the beginning data, supplemented
by other court records in each case.

My first introduction to law and economics was not Richard Posner’s (1987)
“market for babies,”1 but Mnookin and Kornhauser’s (1979) “Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law,”2 which stands, as my teaching interests have, at the
Research assistant Nicholas Keppel xeroxed nearly all of the material used in this study, kept
accurate and extensive notes on what was not copied, and coded the data from the agreements.
Katie Brinig spent many hours scanning the documents so they were in usable (and portable)
form. Iowa colleagues who have given useful comments include Stephanos Bibas, Herb
Hovencamp and Gerald Wetlaufer. Colleagues from other schools and disciplines who’ve been
very helpful include Douglas Allen and Steven Nock. This paper was presented at Washington
University in St. Louis and at the Canadian Law &and Economics Assoc.iation annual meeting in
Toronto, 2003. I also wish to acknowledge helpful suggestions made by two anonymous
referees.
1 The original paper containing the basic idea was Landes and Posner (1978).
2 The idea and the title have spawned a number of papers, in family law as well as other fields.
For family law pieces, see Bix (1998) (problems with enforcement when the judgment of makers
of agreements is clouded by love); and Wax (1998) (women have the best bargaining power
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intersection of dispute resolution and family law. Through the years,
“Bargaining in the Shadow” has remained one of my favorites, both because it
is so teachable and because it holds so many interesting ideas. In practice, as
with many theoretical models, Mnookin and Kornhauser’s predictions do not
always bear out. Their punch line is that with the change in custody laws (or
endowment points) from a nearly infallible presumption in favor of the
wife/mother to an indeterminate best-interest-of-the-child standard, women
should lose. Because they would be willing to settle to avoid even a small
chance of loss of custody of their children, Mnookin and Kornhauser postulate
that women should get less in property in an indeterminate custody system
than they would under the older maternal preference rule.
What empirical research shows is that even with changes in child custody
regimes, not much has changed—neither with the way parents share custody
time, nor with the way they (and courts) divide property.3 Nor, as we will see
from the empirical investigation that follows, does what other couples get
when they go to court relate very closely to what most couples settle for on
their own.4
Scholars explain these apparent deviations from the Coase theorem (Coase,
1960)5 in a number of ways. Some argue that the legal change did not bring
about distributional changes because there were (and are) significant
transaction costs associated with divorce. That is, the rate of divorce changed.6
before marriage). For others, see, e.g., Rossi (2001); Hoffmann et al. (2001); Busch and
Reinhardt (2000); Dana and Koniak (1999); O'Rourke (1997); Yarkon (1997); Ford (1995);
Standen (1993); and Goldberg (1987).
3 For previous considerations of the problem, see Brinig and Alexeev (1993); Garrison (1991);
Kelly and Fox (1993); and Landes (1978). For example, Weiss and Willis (1993:629, 656, Table 4)
show that divorced wives with children received a mean of $9313 in no-fault states, compared to
$5220 in fault states (as we define them). In most of these studies, however, the difference in
payouts is not significant.
4 The couples who actually litigate divorce cases, as we will see, differ from those who settle in
a number of ways. Though the law (legislated and common law) certainly applies to both the
litigating and settling groups, the litigators in family law seem prepared to sacrifice not only
material resources but the well-being of their children to make a point. Mnookin and
Kornhauser (1979) mention this, but in the context of the greater willingness of mothers to
settle. The litigators thus are those who chose the “threat point,” or BATNA in the language of
dispute resolution, see Fisher and Ury (1991).
5 The Coase theorem, at least in its incarnation that people should bargain to an efficient
outcome regardless of the way the law allocates rights, was first applied to changes in divorce
laws in Peters (1986). For other studies of the effect of the change in laws on divorce rates, see
Marvell (1989:544); Nakonezy et al. (1995); and Allen (1992). See also Parkman (1992); and
particularly Friedberg (1998).
6 See Brinig and Buckley (1998:325-40 and sources cited therein), and sources cited in footnote
6 above. Contra, see Ellman and Lohr (1998).
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(As a practical matter, the lowering of the general transaction costs associated
with proving grounds for divorce might be cancelled out by the increased
transaction costs involved with proving “best interests.”)7 Mnookin (and others
working with him) explained that although the awards under the new statutes
themselves might change, people would, despite the legal awards, eventually
settle into the more familiar pattern of maternal custody and paternal visitation
(Maccoby and Mnookin, 1992). Or there simply might be a change in the
frequency of going to court rather than settling (and a corresponding lowering
of amounts paid to lawyers, increasing the couple’s financial pie).8
This article offers another look at Mnookin and Kornhauser’s bargaining
paradigm, using the lens of socioeconomics.9 This nomenclature hints that the
result will be more nuanced, that feelings and distributional consequences will
factor in to the account, and that any model offered will be subject to the
scrutiny of empirical testing and “real life.” More generally, I hope to begin a
discussion of bargaining not merely in the shadow of the law, but also through
the powerfully distorting lens of violated trust. I ignore for the sake of
simplicity, and as Mnookin and Kornhauser do, the large and growing number
(recently at least 50 percent) of couples who are childless at divorce,10 since
divorce bargaining in these cases feels one- rather than two-dimensional. We
are left with the fairly typical case of a couple with at least one minor child, in
7 Proving best interests may require the use of expert psychological or psychiatric testimony, as
proving adultery or abuse typically does not. In conflicted cases, states may require appointment
of a guardian ad litem for the child, and the cost will typically be assessed to the parents. For
example, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, Section 310 (1998) states, "The court may
appoint an attorney to represent the interests of a minor or dependent child with respect to his
support, custody, and visitation." This section of the UMDA has been adopted in Illinois,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington. According to Elrod and Spector (2000:865,
909, Chart 2), attorneys for children or guardians ad litem are required in 39 states plus the
District of Columbia. For a description of how children actually work with their lawyers, see
Buss (1999). Alternatively, Mechoulan (2001) shows first a rising and then a falling of divorce
rates after no-fault. His explanation is that people are taking the new rules into account and
delaying marriages, producing better marriages over time. The explanation above may also be
true—the undoubted decrease in transaction costs produced by no-fault may cancel, in effect,
with the increase in costs brought about by the subsequent change in custody rules.
8 See, e.g., Brinig and Alexeev (1993).
9 For a description of the field, see Harrison (1999).
10 In our sample of Johnson County divorces, 169 of 348 couples, or 48.9%, had minor
children when they divorced, so to call it a significant minority is not really accurate. For data on
the number of children involved in 1989-90 divorces by state, see Clarke (1995:13, Table 4): “In
1989 and 1990, just over half of the divorcing couples had children under 18 years of age at the
time of their divorce, while 47% were childless or had children who were older than 18 years of
age.”. Similar data from Oregon in 2002 indicate 7,411 couples with at least one minor child out
of 16,583 (44.6%).
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perhaps a 5-10 year marriage that has, in the language of cooks, “turned.”
Perhaps it does not matter why, but a marriage which had begun with trust,
hope and self-sacrifice has devolved into an exchange model (with tit-for-tat
bargaining) (Hanson, 1991),11 perhaps into what Lundberg and Pollak (1993)
call the “Separate Spheres” marriage12 and, finally, to impasse.
At a core level, the couple no longer trusts (Brinig and Nock, 2003). My
guess, though I have no data and am uncertain how I’d get it, is that, as with
most other problems in marriage, this lack of trust can be found
symptomatically or causally in their sexual relationship.13 One spouse (or both)
may actually violate the trust by becoming involved sexually outside the
marriage. One spouse (or both), even though not physically involved, may
accuse the other of infidelity or the legally lesser “disloyalty.”14 Or, perhaps
more commonly still, one (or both) spouses may feel that the other no longer
takes his/her sexual needs fully into account. One spouse may not trust the
other for romance or orgasm.
At any rate, one spouse, typically the wife (Brinig and Allen, 2000), cannot
handle the current unhappiness and files for divorce. Armed by counsel,15 and
perhaps under the watchful eye of a mediator,16 bargaining ensues.
What happens to each spouse’s feelings during this transitional period? Both
spouses will, to a greater or lesser degree, feel confused (or conflicted), afraid
(of the unknown future), depressed17 (for to fail at marriage is, after all, to fail
at something important), and lonely (since he or she probably has lost essential
communication with the other spouse).18 The primary custodial parent may
11 For a discussion of the problems of tit-for-tat in marriage, see Brinig (2001). “Tit-for-tat”
comes from the bargaining literature. See generally Axelrod (1984).
12 In this unhappy marriage, couples descend to performing only the stereotypical husband and
wife gender roles, with the man being merely a good provider and the wife merely a good
homemaker. This situation is similar to what Lloyd Cohen (1987:300-301) hypothesized for
specific performance of marital services.
13 For an attempt to answer some of these questions using empirical data, see Allen and Brinig
(1998).
14 A cultural anthropologist who studies infidelity is William Jankowiac (1989). See also Fisher
(1992).
15 In our sample of 140 cases with minor children under 14, all but 10 of the wives were
represented, and all but 47 of the husbands. Only two of the petitioners, both wives, were
unrepresented. In those states where there are streamlined divorce procedures, it is more
common than not for couples to be unrepresented. In Oregon in 1996, 64.5 percent of couples
divorced with neither having counsel.
16 In the 1998 Johnson County sample, only three cases were resolved by a mediator.
17 For a discussion of the stages of divorce and the attorney as a guide to the client’s
progression through them, see Leatherby (1987:25).
18 See Nock (1998) and Marks (1996) for two discussions of this phenomenon.
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also feel angry (for having to deal with grieving children) and overwhelmed (by
having to work and bearing nearly sole responsibility for household and child
care).19 Yet she will usually fare better psychologically because the routine,
though complicated, at least resembles the old life (Whitehead, 1997:78;
Reissmann, 1990:165). The non-custodial spouse may well feel violated as does
the victim of a burglary.20 He may also feel blind-sided and surprised.21
We might expect several typical outcomes of divorce bargaining. One would
be an extension of the “separate spheres,” or minimal performance, solution
envisioned for unhappy couples who stayed married in Lundberg and Pollak
(1993). The authors argued that instead of threatening divorce, an exit strategy,
couples who were no longer happy would revert to the minimum performance
required of husbands and wives, or “separate spheres” behavior. That is, wives
would perform as good housewives,22 and husbands as good breadwinners,23
because they could not be criticized by outsiders or their spouses for playing
these roles.24
In a related vein, we might expect behavior to cluster around certain foci or
norms, as anticipated by Richard McAdams in his important paper on social
norms (McAdams, 2000).25 The prediction for these contracts would be a
strong similarity of contract terms. In fact, both predictions seem borne out by
my study of Michigan interconnection agreements (Brinig, 2004). In that study,

See, e.g., Grillo (1991), Marks (1996).
For a discussion of depression in non-custodial fathers, see Brinig and Nock (2003) (nearly
half a standard deviation more depression, even controlling for the divorce and economic events
in their lives).
21 There are cases in which husband or wife trusts the attorney for the other, when that is not
advisable. Examples include Hale v. Hale, 539 A.2d 247 (Md. App. 1988) (wife trusted husband
that separation agreement was precondition to their reconciliation, apparently until husband
borrowed her suitcases to take his paramour on a vacation); and Francois v. Francois, 599 F.2d
1286 (3rd Cir. 1979)( in which wife systematically bilked the unsuspecting husband of his
considerable assets before leaving the marriage). There is also some evidence that men are more
than occasionally surprised when their wives file for divorce. See Braver et al. (1993) (using the
NSFH, authors note the large number of husbands who were surprised when their wives filed
for divorce).
22 For example, they would ask for primary custody and would seek a share of the marital
home rather than income-producing assets. See Weitzman (1985).
23 Some evidence of the phenomenon (without clear directions for the causation) can be seen
in Johnson (1999). Divorcing husbands would want very definite terms and see responsibility
primarily through their financial contributions. See Fay (1989).
24 The most powerful discussion of this role stereotyping phenomenon appears in Grillo
(1991).
25 For a discussion of social norms generally, see Posner (2000).
19
20
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many of the variables we examined had only one or two solutions and gave
tremendous power to the incumbent telephone company.
All of these strategies speak of minimizing losses, or minimax, a term coined
by von Neumann and Morgenstern in their discussions of game theory.26 To
repeat, unlike most contracts, through which parties seek to maximize profits,
unhappy contracts feature terms designed to minimize the losses of at least one
contracting party. Though one spouse must ultimately file for divorce, spouses
typically do not do so joyously and with great thought of profit, but reluctantly,
fearfully, and with some sadness.27 Divorce usually is a last resort, an admission
that one has made a mistake or that difficulties just could not be worked out.
Divorce is the lesser of two evils (the greater seen as staying married).28 The
contract itself is another step towards admitting failure. The goals may be to
shorten the waiting period,29 to prove that divorce is sought (or at least
uncontested) by both,30 and to establish some financial or other certainty for a
dependent spouse.31 Although there is no conclusive proof of what is the worst
loss for divorcing parents, recent empirical,32 legal,33 and political activities34
suggest that it may be the loss of custody, and even more, the loss of a
meaningful relationship with one’s child.
26 This later turned into the book “The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.” (von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).
27 I note the parallel with some wedding ceremonies. See, e.g., http://www.chicagoweddingrev.com
/sampleceremonies.html; and http://www.manchester. gov.uk/registrars/marriages/cermns.htm.
28 See, e.g., Landes (1978).
29 See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 20-91(9) (six months separation if no children and an agreement).
30 See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 598.8 (2001).
31 Compare ALI Principles, § 4.01 (3) (“The objective of this Chapter is to allocate property by
principles …that are consistent and predictable in application.”), and § 7.02, comment (b), at
956: “Agreements also give parties greater certainty about the future, and about the
consequences of their actions.”
32 See, e.g., Brinig and Allen (2000) (custody arrangements at divorce seem to drive which
spouse will file) and Brinig and Nock (2003) (divorced men significantly more likely to be
depressed if they also lose custody of their children).
33 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Arnold, 679 N.W.2d 296 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting a noncustodial parents’ challenge on due process grounds to the custody standard of “best interest”).
See also Kozlowski (2004). For a website collecting information on the class action litigation
(against “unconstitutional custody statutes”) now filed in 50 jurisdictions, see
http://www.indianacrc.org/.
34 See, e.g., Ill. H.B. 5214 (c): “Unless the court finds the occurrence of ongoing abuse as
defined in Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, the court shall presume
that the maximum involvement and cooperation of both parents regarding the physical, mental,
moral, and emotional well-being of their child is in the best interest of the child. There shall be a
presumption in favor of joint custody, provided that both parents agree to that custody
arrangement.”
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How are contracts structured that will reduce these losses, and how does a
difference in the size or power of the bargaining entities change the final
settlement or contracting result? Considering these contracts as a whole, the
reader is struck with how franchise-like they are.35 Many of them (and
particularly the ones that have been successfully amended over time), give great
power to the custodial parent because so much is left unspecified (that is,
relational). On the other hand, many of the more successful contracts are for
relatively short periods of time (one to three years before modification based
upon the children’s age).36 Because they are for more than one year, they are
nonetheless candidates for analysis as relational contracts (Speidel, 2000).
Most relational contracts literature begins with the work of Stewart Macaulay
(1963), who studied the contracting practices of Wisconsin firms in the early
1960s.37 More recently, Professor Ian Macneil (Macneil, 1980; Trebilcock,
1993) 38 and former Dean Robert Scott (Scott, 1987; Goetz and Scott,
35 For a law-and-economics discussion of franchise arrangements, see Hadfield (1990). For its
theoretical application to families, including divorcing families, see Brinig (1996) and Brinig
(2000:188-91, 194-96).
36 Consensual modifications to the contracts occurred more often when the oldest child was
older (i.e., when the time for performance was relatively short).
37 Macaulay found that the parties specified time of performance, price, and quantity, but left
most other terms unspecified. They did not resort to legal enforcement when they “cancelled a
contract,” but rather freely adjusted contractual relations as they went along. Macaulay (1977)
later extended his work to several foreign countries. In a more recent empirical look at contract
terms, Russell Weintraub (1992) sent a questionnaire to general counsel for 182 firms eliciting
information on contract practices and views as to desirable contract policy. Two of Weintraub’s
respondents were from “utilities other than gas or electricity” (1992:16). Information included
contract devices used to protect against market shifts during long-term contracts, the frequency
with which companies request relief from or modification of contractual obligations, the results
of such requests, and the use of and extent of reliance on firm offers. Weintraub also asked
whether corporate executives would make more or less legalistic responses to a set of three
hypothetical business problems than would general counsel (1992:1-3). Weintraub stresses
nonlegal remedies such as reputation costs, but notes the increased use of litigation for contract
disputes, and the tendency of judges to award even punitive damages for breach of contract
cases (Weintraub, 1992:7-8, n.28):
In California from 1980 to 1984, "punitive damages were assessed against 35%
of defendants who were found to have breached contracts" (Peterson et al.,
1987:viii). From the 1960s to the 1980s, the number of punitive damage awards in
business contract cases more than quintupled in Cook County, Illinois, and more
than quadrupled in San Francisco. The total awards in constant dollars increased
from less than $500,000 in each of those jurisdictions in the 1960s to $14 million in
Cook County and $17 million in San Francisco during the first five years of the
1980s (Peterson et al., 1987:23-24).
38 See also Macneil (1978). For a recent discussion of Macneil’s work, see Speidel (2000). For a
highly critical essay, see Barnett (1992).
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1981:1149; Scott, 2000:849-53; Goetz and Scott., 1980:1300; Scott, 1990)39
have taken up the challenge of writing about relational contracts, each
generating several useful papers on the subject. Macaulay, Macneil and Scott all
assume that in complex, long-term contracting, many terms will be left
deliberately vague or not included at all. The parties, because of the strength of
their relationship and the substantial investments each has in the venture,40 are
likely to mutually agree to alter the contract as things change.41
Thus, Macneil’s colleague Richard Speidel writes in a recent piece (that also
summarizes previous scholarship on relational contracting):
First, the exchange relationship extends over time. It is not a "spot"
market deal. Rather, it is more like a long-term supply contract,
franchise or distribution arrangement, or a marriage. Second, because of
the extended duration, parts of the exchange cannot be easily measured
or precisely defined at the time of contracting. This dictates a planning
strategy that favors open terms, reserves discretion in performance to
39 See also Scott and Scott (1998) (relational contracting theory applied to family law); and for
related work see Ayres and Gertner (1989). All these works suggest that the courts will fill the
gaps left in contracts with “default rules”: What the parties would probably have agreed to had
they thought about the problem at the time of contracting. But see Schwartz (1992) (concluding
that courts, lacking sufficient information about party intent and market alternatives, are
reluctant to intervene if the parties have failed to agree).
40 On the role of reputation as a substitute for contract remedies, see Kornhauser (1983). See
also Scott (1987:2026-27); Gillette (1985:559-60); and Milgrom et al. (1990:3): "It is well
known...that in long-term, frequent bilateral exchange, the value of the relationship itself may
serve as an adequate bond to ensure honest behavior and promote trust between the parties."
For example, see Gillette (2002:1168): “Reputation is particularly effective in relational situations
because long-term contracts tend to be incompletely contingent; as a consequence, the specific
obligations of the parties, and hence the existence of breach, are highly uncertain. Ex post
enforcement costs will therefore be high, and ex ante constraints such as reputation can
therefore compensate for the risk of underenforcement.”
41 Weintraub (1992:19-21) notes: “Relational contracts involve parties who are presently
performing a long-term contract or have dealt with one another many times in the past and are
likely to do so in the future. Discrete contracts involve parties who have not dealt with one
another before or, if they have, probably will not contract again. Relational contracts are likely to
predominate in well-organized markets; discrete contracts will typify sales that take place
sporadically, such as sales of real estate. There are important differences between situations in
which parties have developed a relationship and those in which the contract is an isolated
occurrence. When a dispute arises, parties with a history of mutually beneficial dealings are less
likely to resort to litigation than are strangers. Efficiency is one incentive for amicable resolution
of a relational dispute. Each party has custom-shaped its operations to meet the other's needs
and these transaction costs would be wasted if the relationship ended. Moreover, in wellorganized markets where relational contracts predominate, a reputation for litigiousness is
particularly undesirable.” [citations omitted].
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one or both parties, and incorporates dispute resolution procedures,
such as mediation or arbitration, into the contract. The inability of the
parties to "presentiate" the terms of the bargain at the time of
contracting shifts the focus to circumstances and conduct that occur ex
post contract. Third, in the words of Lewis Kornhauser, in a relational
contract the "interdependence of the parties to the exchange extends at
any given moment beyond the single discrete transaction to a range of
social interrelationships." [citations omitted] (Speidel, 2000:823-24)42
The current examination of divorcing couples combines relational contracting
and family law. I set out to discover, if possible, why couples choose particular
terms in their settlement agreements (called stipulations in Iowa) and how
these contractual arrangements fare over time.
I began with the complete set of divorce files initiated in 1998 in Johnson
County, Iowa.43 These were set apart for me and my research assistants in a
series of file drawers in the Johnson County courthouse, where they become
public records when the divorce is final. The divorce was final in 348 of the
cases. From these cases, we eliminated all those with no minor children, since
these were less likely to involve complex bargaining and unlikely to require
adjustment over time.44 This meant that 175 cases were eliminated. We also
eliminated the 29 cases in which the only children involved were over 14 at the
time of filing, since we believed these would not require adjustment over a long
time horizon: our goal was to have around five years’ experience with the
contracts. We therefore worked with 140 cases.
We xeroxed and then scanned major documents in each case,45 and kept
notes describing other court contacts, identifying later motions,46 stipulations,47

42 For other work, see Speidel (1985:483-579, selected bibliography in app. A). The existence
and importance of relational contracts in the real world has also been verified in an empirical
study (Weintraub, 1992:16-24).
43 This is the county encompassing Iowa City and the University of Iowa. According to the
2000 Census, Johnson County has a population of 111,006. It is one of the most educated
counties in the country, with 47.6% of its population having at least a bachelor’s degree
(compared to less than 25% nationally), and has a median household income of $40,060. It is
one of the most racially diverse counties in Iowa, with nearly 10% of residents being nonwhite.
44 For these couples, it is far more likely for a no-fault divorce to be a “clean break,” the goal
sought by family law reformers.
45 In each case, this included the Petition for Dissolution, Affidavits of Financial Status filed by
both parties, their written stipulation, if they had one, and the Final Judgment of Dissolution.
Because there were children, Iowa requires each couple to attend a parenting class. Since there
was one in each file, the parenting class-associated documents were not included. Some cases
had Motions for Temporary Relief with attached affidavits: these were xeroxed.
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and adjustments. For each case, we coded basic demographic data,48 data that
potentially involved any power each spouse might have (such as income level
and independent wealth),49 the names of the attorneys, if any, for each spouse,
which spouse filed the case, and whether the case was resolved through
stipulation (the local name for a property settlement agreement). We noted the
type and number of actions prior to the divorce as well as those that followed
the divorce. We noted the custody arrangement,50 whether or not there was
substantial visitation (which we defined as thirty percent of the time or more),
whether or not the parties had a complicated visitation schedule (by number of
paragraphs, which varied from 0 to 21), whether or not they imposed
limitations on leaving the state, whether they provided for religious training of
the children, whether or not the parties agreed to child support significantly
deviating from the statutory guidelines,51 whether they provided for the college
education of children, whether there was alimony (found in only 7 percent of
the settled cases), how the divorcing spouses divided various classes of assets,
how they agreed to deal with modifications, and so forth.
Consistent with prior studies, most of these cases settled before the divorce
hearing: 88 percent used contracts to settle all matters dealing with custody and
visitation, child support, property division and alimony.52 Also consistent with
prior studies, wives brought the vast majority of the divorce actions (78
These most frequently included motions to change custody, motions to prevent relocation,
and motions of various kinds to collect child support.
47 Most frequently, these were changes in custody or visitation arrangements, or were to note
that amounts owed had been paid. Some were also for changes in the amount of agreed-upon
support.
48 This included the date of marriage (from which the length of the marriage could be
calculated), the dates of birth of husband and wife (from which the ages of husband and wife,
and the age of wife at marriage could be calculated), the number, ages and genders of the
children, income of the wife, income of the husband, independent assets of the wife,
independent assets of the husband, and assets over $100,000.
49 Education levels, highly correlated with employment prospects, would have been valuable
but simply were not available in the vast majority of cases.
50 Custody arrangements were classified into husband custody, joint custody (nearly a 50-50
share), or wife custody.
51 Iowa Child Support Guidelines appear in Iowa Court Rule Chapter 9, and the worksheets for
calculating the guideline amount appear in Court Rule 9.13. Guidelines are required by the Social
Security Act, Child Support Enforcement Assistance Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §658, and have
been criticized by both wives (as not meeting their children’s needs, see Comment to § 3.04,
American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution at 435-36, 2002) and
husbands (Ward, 2003). For an analysis of the debate, see Betson et al. (1992).
52 The 90% settlement figure comes from Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979). See also Maccoby
and Mnookin (1992).
46
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percent). Nearly all (90 percent of the divorces) involved “joint legal
custody.”53 Sixty-nine percent involved generous sharing of custody, though
only 7.1% (10 cases) had approximately equal time shares. Only another 10
cases had father custody. These Johnson County marriages lasted slightly
longer than was found in divorce studies that do not involve only couples with
minor children,54 averaging almost exactly 11 years before divorce.
Iowa adopted a no-fault law in the 1970s.55 This means that, legally, fault is
completely irrelevant in the state. It makes no difference to whether or not, or
how soon, a complainant can obtain a divorce. It also cannot affect the amount
of alimony or property distribution a spouse receives.56 Thus, fault does not
appear in the legal pleadings themselves, even for one spouse to obtain some
advantage. Nonetheless, the divorcing spouses in Johnson County (or their
lawyers) could not restrain themselves from putting allegations of fault

53 The Iowa Code, in § 598.41 (5) (2001) provides: “Joint physical care may be in the best
interest of the child, but joint legal custody does not require joint physical care….If one joint
custodial parent is awarded physical care, the parent responsible for providing physical care shall
support the other parent’s relationship with the child. Physical care awarded to one parent does
not affect the other parent’s rights and responsibilities as a joint legal custodian of the child.
Rights and responsibilities as joint legal custodian of the child include, but are not limited to,
equal participation in decisions affecting the child’s legal status, medical care, education,
extracurricular activities, and religious instruction.”
In contrast, Michael Newdow, the plaintiff in the recent Supreme Court case of Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301 (2004), did not have prudential standing to attack the
pledge of allegiance under the Establishment Clause because his former wife had “‘sole legal
custody as to the rights and responsibilities to make decisions relating to the health, education
and welfare of ’ her daughter” (at 2310).
54 Such studies report an average length before divorce of seven years. For a review, see Allen
and Brinig (1998).
55 The sections were added by Acts 1970 (63 [Iowa] G.A.) ch. 1266, §§ 1et seq., now codified at
Iowa Code §§ 598.3 et seq. (2001). Fault is irrelevant to prove divorce, for under § 598.8 (2)(1)
(2001) (governing cases that do not require a hearing), the petitioner must show that “The
parties have certified in writing that there has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to
the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed and there remains no
reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be preserved.” In other cases, Iowa Code § 598.17
(2001) provides that “A decree dissolving the marriage may be entered when the court is satisfied
from the evidence presented that there has been a breakdown of the marriage relationship to the
extent that the legitimate objects have been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood
that the marriage can be preserved.” The decree shall state that the dissolution is granted to “the
parties.” Id. Fault has not been significant in reaching a property distribution since In re Marriage
of Willcoxson, 250 N.W.2d 525 (Iowa. 1977), nor for alimony since In re Tjaden’s Marriage, 199
N.W.2d 475 (Iowa. 1972).
56 For a lengthy discussion of fault and no-fault legislation, a classification of all states, and an
argument that fault should be excluded, see American Law Institute (2002:42-54).
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somewhere in the files (frequently in the spouse’s affidavits).57 Thus, adultery
could be identified from the files in 6 cases,58 domestic violence in 9,59 child
abuse in 13.60 One case involved both child abuse and adultery,61 and one
involved both child abuse and domestic violence. Twenty-six separate cases
(18.6 %) therefore involved at least one type of fault. These fault cases were
much less likely to settle and, even holding the failure to settle constant, much
more likely to produce substantial post-divorce litigation. This finding confirms
what women’s advocates62 and mediators (Gaughan, 1981:39-41, 63)63 have
been arguing for some years: these cases are simply poor candidates for
mediation. Significant Pearson correlations64 show that fault was positively
related to provisions regarding religious education and training (suggesting that
couples with strong religious preferences needed more than just incompatibility
to justify leaving marriages, or that these marriages were simply better ones),65
and was more common in marriages that had not accumulated more than

57 This result was predicted in Wardle (1991) (presenting what might be termed a “hydraulic”
model in which fault that is suppressed in the divorce proceedings surfaces elsewhere).
58 Adultery was most commonly brought up by one spouse to reduce the other spouse’s
chances of getting custody. There was also a suggestion in one case that the adulterous spouse
squandered marital resources on the paramour.
59 No-contact orders appeared in most of these files. Sometimes they did not appear directly,
but were mentioned in affidavits involving limits on visitation.
60 Usually these were in the context of petitions for temporary custody, sole custody, changes
of custody, or limits on visitation.
61 This was the only case of husband adultery, and the wife alleged “numerous male sex
partners,” at least one of whom sexually abused the child in question.
62 Probably the best known of these pieces is Lerman (1984).
63 See also Lundstrom (1998): “It's not recommended for dissolving marriages troubled by
violence, alcoholism, or mental impairment. And without the courts' discovery process, it doesn't
work if either party is intent on hiding assets.”
64 The correlation between two variables reflects the degree to which the variables are related.
The most common measure of correlation is the Pearson Product Moment Correlation (called
Pearson's correlation for short). Pearson's correlation reflects the degree of linear relationship
between two variables. It ranges from +1 to -1. A correlation of +1 means that there is a perfect
positive linear relationship between variables (that is, as one value increases, so does the other by
proportionately as much).
65 See, e.g., Nock et al. (2003): “The implications of such a finding are that successful marriages
are not necessarily based on a religious foundation, but rather the values embraced by all major
religions in regard to marriage serve the same purpose. In other words, it is the institutional view
of marriage (a model that stresses the traditional vows of matrimony) that appears important,
whether this is strictly religious or finds its source elsewhere. This is a theme we are currently
investigating because we believe it is critical that we identify as many sources of strong marriages
as possible. We suspect that such sources include a guiding template of normative beliefs, such
as those shown in this presentation.”
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$100,000 in assets. It was also closely associated with an age difference between
husband and wife.66
The role of attorneys also prominently features in this study. In each case, we
knew who represented the petitioner and respondent. We counted how many
cases in the sample each attorney handled for wives, husbands, and in total,
and found that attorney experience made a substantial difference (usually in a
positive direction), both in contract terms chosen and in how the parties
adjusted over time to changing circumstances. Having an attorney experienced
in family law ultimately proved cost-effective for most of the subjects of this
study.67
Can we predict which cases will settle and which will litigate? Here attorney
experience, by any of our measures, was uncorrelated with choice of dispute
resolution. Neither was wealth or income. However, if one of the parties
ultimately was chosen as a sole custodian (less than 30% visitation time given
to the other party), the parties were far less likely to settle.68 Where fault was
involved, there was also less settlement (as we discussed before).
Which terms promote fewer conflicts over time? We can answer this question
using either a positive or negative approach. The positive one asks how often
the parties were able to reach consensus or modify the contract after divorce.
Here total attorney experience and experience of the wife’s attorney were
significantly related. Consensual modification was significantly (at the .01 level)
more likely as the number of children increased, when the first child was older,
and if the parties had an ongoing business partnership (such as a Christmas
tree farm, interest in a patent, or stock options in a company). In fact, an
ongoing economic tie was associated with many desirable things in this study:
longer marriages before divorce, greater accumulation of assets, more
experienced attorneys (both for husbands and in total), and more independent
wealth of wives. Consensual modification was also more likely if either the wife
or the husband had independent wealth, and if the parties included a term for
an automatic adjustment of child support based on income changes of the
parents.
66 For an explanation of why that might be, based upon gendered variance in sexual interest
over the life-course, see Allen and Brinig (1998).
67 The exceptions are the number of post-divorce litigation events, which increases positively
with the number of case for husbands handled by husband’s attorney, and the prediction of
whether there will be post divorce litigation at all, which varied positively with the total number
of cases in the sample handled by both attorneys.
68 As my colleague Jerry Wetlaufer points out, judges may be more apt to award sole custody
when the parties cannot get along well enough to agree to any sort of complicated sharing of
time with children. It is difficult to sort out cause and effect, in other words.
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The negative approach looks at post-divorce litigation (usually motions or
sometimes enforcement mechanisms). There was more litigation when the first
child was older, as the number of children increased, and when the total
experience of the attorneys increased, and significantly less of it when the
parties provided for an automatic adjustment based upon the child’s age.
Surprisingly, traditional power variables such as income and independent
wealth played little role in what the parties agreed to (or whether they were able
to live with their agreement).69 Obviously, higher income parents (who were
most likely college educated themselves in our highly educated county) were
more apt to include college educations for their children in the agreements. So
were women who married when they were older (probably because they were
highly educated themselves or had more job experience). College education
provisions were predictably more frequent with older children, and when the
wife was represented by an attorney handling more women’s cases in the
sample. No couples who litigated included college education provisions in the
final court-ordered decree.70 Higher income couples also had more assets and a
greater variety of assets to divide. Greater wealth and higher income were, not
surprisingly, associated closely with longer marriages.
The agreements varied widely in their treatment of visitation: some did not
include schedules at all, while others had very complex visitation schedules (up
to 21 paragraphs of treatment). The more complicated the schedule, the less
likely that one parent had “sole custody,” and the more likely that the attorneys
involved were very experienced with other cases in the sample. These
complicated schedules were also related to having provisions specifying
religious upbringing and education.
Provisions limiting or suggesting changes when the custodial spouse relocated
were more common when the wife was older when she married, when the
couple had assets of more than $100,000 and when the husband possessed
independent wealth. The first correlation suggests that these wives might be
more mobile, while the last two suggest that there might be property in Iowa
that would be difficult for the non-custodial parent to leave behind.
69 Nor did the age of the wife at marriage. Generally speaking, women who marry young are
less likely to have completed an education or launched a career before having children. Women
who delayed marriage until completing education or having significant job experience were likely
to have better employment opportunities outside marriage and therefore to be in a better
bargaining position.
70 Iowa Code § 598.21 (5)(A) (2001) justifies a college education award of up to 1/3 from each
parent. Litigating couples might not have included college provisions because they were simply
too bitter to be thinking in long range terms about their children at this time, or because they’d
expended the resources that would otherwise be set aside for the children’s education.
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Beginning with the knowledge gained from running the simple correlations, we
can go more deeply into causation than we can just by seeing that if one thing
increases, another changes in some way. As social scientists know, this is never
an exact science, for some portion (and in these cases, a large amount) of the
change in the dependent variable is not explained by the “right-hand side” or
independent variables. For example, we can take three factors that we know are
all correlated with fault divorces: whether or not the couple had a provision on
religious education or upbringing in their settlement agreement, whether or not
they had accumulated assets over $100,000 and the age difference of the
spouses. We speculated earlier that more religious couples might feel more
comfortable alleging fault if they decided to end a marriage.71 That is, for
religious reasons, they believe they should not abandon a marriage without very
significant reason. In legal terms, these reasons translate into the traditional
fault grounds of adultery and marital violence (abuse). Adultery has been
recognized as a reason for divorce since Biblical times. Marital violence has
been grounds for a legal separation at least since the first divorces were granted
in colonial America.72 But the fault that might break up a marriage will likely
have occurred before the contract (including the religious upbringing) is
drafted: that is, the direction of the causation is more likely from fault to the
contract provision rather than the other way around: greater religiosity, which
we cannot measure, likely affects both variables. We nonetheless would predict
a positive sign on the variable. The age difference variable should also have a
positive sign, though here the direction is clearer: whatever changed about the
marital dynamic because the spouses had a bigger gap between their ages likely
occurred long before they drafted the contract. Finally, we consider the assets
over $100,000 variable. In a turbulent marriage, one would predict that it
would be less likely that the parties would accumulate substantial assets. Many
studies have found that both domestic violence and child abuse complaints
71 It is possible, though not so likely, that more religious people commit more abuse or
adultery. This behavior would certainly be contrary to the doctrine of mainstream religions, if
not all religions.
72 For a discussion of the historical treatment of fault at divorce, see Brinig and Carbone
(1988:860-61). Before 1600, the Catholic Church interpreted Matthew 5:31 (“Whosoever shall
put away his wife, excepting the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit adultery: and he that
shall marry her that is put away, committeth adultery”) to mean that validly contracted marriages
could not be dissolved. The Church formalized this position at the Council of Trent in 1563
(Phillips, 1988:34-46). Annulment was available because without a marriage there was no bond to
dissolve. For other discussions, see Brinig and Crafton (1994:876-77); Rheinstein (1956:654); and
Hartog (1991).
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increase as families are less wealthy,73 so we would expect a negative
coefficient. In fact, just looking at the abuse cases, the coefficient is negative,
but not significant at the .05 level of confidence. So it seems that it is not just
abuse, but the six adultery cases that play a role here. This observation is borne
out by what we have seen before about adultery—the claim sometimes was
made in the context of wasting marital assets on the paramour, which should
have a negative impact on family wealth. Table III shows what happens if we
combine all three factors:74 we can predict nearly .12 of the difference in the
probability of fault in these cases. Two of the three factors are statistically
significant at less than the .05 level, and the probability of fault being involved
more than quintuples if the couple has a provision on religious education in
their agreement.
The causation question can be more nearly sorted out by looking at the
regressions as a series of questions, each of which produces a result in an
equation (called Two Stage Least Squared or 2SLS). Because the first equation
in each series (predicting the existence or not of a contract provision) is binary,
the method for doing a 2SLS becomes (1) estimate the existence of the
contract provision using a Logistic Regression, and (2) estimate the result (here,
the number of consensual modifications, the number of post-litigation events,
or whether or not there is post-divorce litigation based upon a saved predicted
probability from (1) plus new predictors). Thus, the model for Tables IV and V
is as follows:

(1) Automatic Income Adjustment in Agreement (AI) = f(Experience of

Wife’s Attorney (EW), Fault in Case (F), Independent Wealth of Wife
(IW)), and

(2) Number of Consensual Modifications (CM) = f(AI (predicted),
Continuing Business or Partnership (CB), and Number of Children (C)).75

Attorneys who have more experience handling cases for women (measured by
those they handled during 1998) are likely to suggest that their clients ask for
automatic increases in child support. They probably choose the income
73 This does not mean that abuse is confined to the impoverished, just that there tends to be
more of it when resources are scarce (particularly if abusers are unemployed) (Kurz, 1995).
74 Note that because we are including a contract provision, we need to confine our analysis to
those cases settled rather than all of the cases. If the same regression is done with the entire
sample, the R2 is .096, but the coefficients remain significant and have the same sign.
75 When Equation 2 is estimated, instrumental variables include all those from Equation 1.
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variation because it is easier to justify, since the Guidelines themselves are
structured around income differences,76 and proof of income changes will not
be difficult if tax forms are submitted each year. However, proof will be more
difficult if the spouses inherently do not trust each other, as is the case when
fault is alleged. They should be less likely to ask for adjustments in income
when they have less independent wealth to rely on, because poorer wives will
need to rely on steady child support just to make ends meet. (Child support will
decrease, as well as increase, automatically based upon changes in the
husband’s income.)
I hypothesized that the parties would find it much less painful to adjust over
time when they had provided for changes in their agreement, so the predicted
sign on the Automatic Income Adjustment (AI) was positive. I included
ongoing business or partnership not only because there had been a positive
correlation, but because I had anecdotal evidence, from people I knew and
from reported cases, of couples who could successfully continue business
enterprises but who had problems living together as married couples.77 I also
suspected that with more children involved, more cooperation over time would
be needed (and, remember, the litigated cases have been screened out here).
Results are shown in Tables IV through IX. As I hypothesized, the predicted
probability of the automatic adjustment of child support based upon income
was positively and significantly (at .065) related to the number of consensual
modifications (Table V).78 So was a continuing business or partnership (at
.0484),79 and the existence of such an economic partnership contributed more
than any other variable to the final equation. The number of children was also
significant (at .0217).80 These results are all intuitive: if the parties are required,

Thus the husband’s income determines the columns, wife’s the rows, on the chart.
For example, the cafeteria at George Mason Law School was run for at least ten years by a
divorced couple, John and Nancy Martin. The man was the heir to the department store that
became the law school building, and his wife did the cooking. The litigated cases include Bass v.
Bass, 814 S.W. 2d 38 (Tenn. 1991) (video game and diner partnership).
78 We can use the equations generated by the regressions to get some idea of the magnitude of
the effects. Holding other variables at their means and using the coefficients of the tables, if we
vary only the existence or not of the modification provision, the number of modifying
amendments changes from essentially zero (.011) to .5904149. The mean values were .02970 (for
the provision), .06 (business), and 1.75 (number of children).
79 Using the procedure outlined in the preceding footnote, but this time varying only the
existence or not of the continuing business relationship, the number of modifying amendments
changes from essentially zero (.009) to 2.2654557.
80 Using the procedure above, but varying the number of children from 1 (since all couples had
at least one child) to 2, the number of provisions increased by .20.
76
77
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for economic or personal reasons, to be cooperative over some period of time,
they are likely, in this kind of “friendly divorce,” to adjust.
Next, we turn to the less happy question of what produces continued
litigation. The contract provision (as opposed to failure to settle at all) that was
correlated with post-litigation events turns out to be another automatic child
support adjustment, this time for the age of the child. We would predict that,
like the automatic adjustment for income, this type of planning ahead would be
related to better behavior (that is, it would be negatively related to the number
of post-divorce litigation events). The first step is to predict the likelihood of
such a provision, again using a logistic regression. (See Table VI). Correlations
revealed that such adjustments were more likely when the parties
simultaneously agreed to vary the amount of child support from the Guidelines
amount, and that the likelihood should increase as the variance increased. Why
might this be so? These couples might see the need for generous provision for
children, and might recognize (as is the truth) that the child’s needs would
increase as the child aged (ALI, 2002:§3.05A, Comment l, at 603). This
tendency would be more likely when there was a big discrepancy between the
husband’s income (typically the non-custodial parent) and the wife’s (typically
the primary custodial parent).
As noted, the automatic adjustment of child support should be inversely
related to the number of post-divorce litigation events. The interesting factor in
these equations (and the reason we have included Table VIII) is the role of the
experienced attorney for the husband. Though this was statistically unrelated to
provisions specifying age-related adjustments (though it was negative—these
provisions are sought by women and their attorneys), the husband’s attorney’s
experience was positively related to the number of post-litigation events,81 and,
when the child support deviation was included as an instrumental variable,
statistically significant (at .03) and with a larger standardized coefficient than
the predicted probability term. What are these attorneys doing? Most likely,
they try to limit automatic provisions of this kind, which can only increase (as
opposed to the income-based ones, which can decrease as well). If the
provisions are included, later litigation (to resist collection of child support,
81 To get some idea of the magnitude here, by plugging actual (as opposed to predicted)
average values into the equation and varying only the experience of the attorney handling
husbands’ cases by adding one more case in the sample, the number of post-divorce litigation
events increased from 1.62555 for the attorney who handled the average number of cases
(2.7021) to 2.0320073 if the attorney handled just one more divorce case for a husband in the
sample. Comparing this with contracts that did or didn’t have modifications based upon the
child’s age, again plugging in mean values otherwise into the equation, the number of postlitigation events without the provision was 8.80, and with the provision .456634 (a very
significant decrease indeed).
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decrease amounts paid or change custody) may be sought when their (male)
clients claim that their ex-wives are not granting sufficient visitation, are not
spending the child support money on the child, do not need the amount
provided for in the agreement, and so forth.
Finally, in Table IX we consider how well the automatic adjustments for age
and other factors predict the presence or absence of any adversarial postdivorce litigation. Since the dependent variable is binary, again we run a logistic
regression. We would predict, based upon our prior discussion of them, that
the coefficient for an automatic age-based adjustment would be negative, and
that the coefficient for the presence of fault grounds (child abuse, domestic
violence or adultery would be positive). This time we include two other factors.
One is another provision: religious education or upbringing, which might be
positive, since it is related to the presence of fault grounds, or negative, if it
indicated a more forgiving attitude or greater concern for the children. We also
included an attorney experience provision: the number of cases in the sample
handled by both husband’s and wife’s attorneys. This, we would guess, would
be positive, because experienced attorneys (holding the agreements the parties
wrote constant) would enforce agreements for support and visitation before
arrearages accumulated significantly or denial of visitation became a big
problem.
As Table IX shows, all these factors were significant. The most important,
more than tripling the likelihood of litigation (and significant at .096), is the
presence of fault.82 The second most influential coefficient was the attorney
experience variable, significant at .005. Decreasing by more than 36% were
both the provision for automatic adjustment of child support and the religious
education provision, significant at .033 and .046, respectively.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
What can we learn from Johnson County divorce files? First, many factors that
Mnookin and Kornhauser (and economist Elizabeth Peters) would have
predicted would be important do not seem to have really large effects. How
custody is arranged (except in cases where visitation is really limited) does not
affect much in terms of litigation or the terms of the agreement. Child support
always ceases when the child becomes emancipated or reaches majority.83
Neither does the most obvious indication of power, the absolute and relative
82 For a discussion of the importance of real as opposed to statistical significance, see
McCloskey and Siliak (1996).
83 Iowa Code § 598.1 (6) (2001), with exceptions for children in college between 18 and 22 or
children of any age who remain dependent because of disability.
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incomes of husband and wife (though differences in income do matter in the
equation on automatic adjustment for the age of the child).
However, some factors do matter. The most obvious of these is the presence
of child abuse, domestic violence or adultery. In cases where these traditional
marital “fault grounds” appear, we see much less cooperative behavior either in
terms of coming to a settlement, including automatic adjustment terms, or
post-divorce litigation (even for those spouses able to come to written
agreements). In a positive vein, we see in a number of cases the importance of
some sort of ongoing business or partnership in enabling divorcing spouses to
work out their problems. Finally, the previous experience of the attorneys
involved in the case seems to be critical in terms of getting clients to come to
settlement and to agree on terms that will help them adjust over time (though
there may be more litigation after the divorce, particularly if the former
husbands have experienced attorneys).84
This brings us back to our original prediction that parties will select contract
terms to minimize potential losses. Unlike the commercial franchise contracts
with which it shares many features, the separation agreement (or stipulation)
typically cannot last for a short time specified in advance, thus reducing the risk
of big losses. When children are involved, provisions for their custody and
support must control through their minority,85 in the analyzed cases at least
four years.
84 Husbands brought actions for change of custody, especially when wives attempted to move
out of the area. They resisted increases in child support, sometimes counterclaiming for more
custody time. Both of these actions are fully consistent with attorney experience. It is less
obvious why in eight cases, experienced family law attorneys would help their clients resist child
support collection efforts by the wives. Of these eight, one attorney represented three clients,
and two others represented two of them. These attorneys may have a reputation as “gunners”
who will litigate. Analysis of all of the cases they handled supports this conclusion. Each had well
above the mean pre- and post- divorce litigation events (1.67, 5.67 and 3.33 before stipulation
compared to the overall mean of 1.35; and 2.67, 3.67 and 2.83 post-divorce litigation events
compared to an overall mean of 1.6). Those with reputations for conflict are generally supposed
to be less successful than those who cooperate, see, e.g., Sobel (1985); Painter (1996:150);
Johnston and Waldfogel (2002); and Gilson and Mnookin (1994:545-46) (describing matrimonial
practice as one in which attorneys can cooperate even though their clients are not equipped to
do so; and one cooperative attorney as reporting “If a client is hell bent upon hiring an advocate
to disembowel the adverse party, I direct them elsewhere"). This may not be true, though, for
first amendment or consumer advocate lawyers, see Hollander-Blumoff (1995).
85 Courts invalidate provisions designed to remove judicial oversight from child support or
custody cases. For example, Anthony v. Anthony, 204 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 1973), holds that an
agreement by a custodial parent to waive child support in return for a promise by the noncustodial parent not to exercise visitation rights was void as contrary to public policy. See also
Goodpasture v. Goodpasture, 7 Va. App. 55, 371 S.E.2d 845 (1988). Also see Iowa Code 598.21(8):
“A modification of a support order…is not valid unless the modification is approved by the
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However, many of the contracts in the Johnson County sample contained
other terms that suggest the parties were trying to minimize their losses. For
example, the provisions for automatic adjustments (for age or income)
minimize the possibility of getting a larger (to the non-custodial spouse) or
smaller (to the custodial spouse) amount should the matter be relitigated at a
later date. In other words, they reduce the variance in the amount of future
child support.86
Most of the studied divorce settlements provided for some reasonable share
of physical custody to go to each parent: there was no complete loss of custody
in any but a few extreme cases.87 In a related vein, a number of the agreements
provided that children could not be moved out of a specified area (sometimes
the metropolitan area, sometimes within 50 or 100 miles, sometimes out of
state) without the relocation becoming a change of circumstances requiring
reassessment of custody. For a non-custodial parent, the greatest fear may well
be losing touch with one’s children by having them move away.
All alimony awards that were agreed to (and, remember, there were only 8 of
these) were for fixed periods (in only two cases for more than 60 months, and
one of these was for $1 per month). For the payor spouses (all husbands), this
short term would limit their exposure, potentially for the remainder of their
working careers.

court, after proper notice and opportunity to be heard is given to all parties to the order, and
entered as an order of the court.”
86 For a discussion of the reduction of variance in the context of the parole evidence rule, see
Posner (1998:542): “This alternative characterization would not affect the analysis for parties that
are risk-averse, since such parties are willing to pay for a reduction in variance. Even risk-neutral
parties would prefer the reduction in variance because the uncertainty of the legal decision in
case of a dispute would cause parties to incur greater litigation costs than they would if the legal
decision could be accurately predicted.”
87 About a quarter of these involved allegations of abuse of a child or the other parent.
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics - All Cases
Descriptive Statistics-All Cases

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Date of Stipulation

138

1998.00

2001.00

1998.7246

.72261

Petitioner (w=1)

107

0

1

.78

.419

Date of Marriage

135

09/11/1971

10/15/1998

07/24/1989

11/18/1588

Age of Wife

138

22.00

52.00

34.0290

6.95338

Age of Husband

136

20.00

55.00

35.8382

7.48452

Difference in Spouses’ Ages

135

.00

15.00

3.3185

3.22456

Wife’s attorney cases for wives in
sample

130

1.00

10.00

3.9231

2.72973

Husband’s attorney cases for
husbands in sample

94

1.00

6.00

2.7021

1.80101

More experienced attorney
(abs 11-13)

57

.00

7.00

2.2105

1.67691

Number of Children

140

1

5

1.75

.760

Age of Child1 (Year of Birth)

141

1975

1998

1990.35

4.953

Sex of Child 1 (1=girl)

137

0

1

.42

.496

Age of Child 2 (Year of Birth)

82

1979

1997

1991.06

4.029

Sex of Child 2 (1=girl)

80

0

1

.48

.503

Age of Child 3

16

1983

1998

1991.06

4.328

Sex of Child 3 (1=girl)

16

0

1

.44

.512

Prior Actions

140

0

1

.14

.344

140

0

3

.32

.771

Fault grounds? (domestic
violence, child abuse, adultery
seen in file)
Income W ($ / year)

118

0

145600

24077.53

19631.983

Income H ($ / year)

117

0

341477

37720.20

39275.416

Guidelines Figure ($ / month)

115

0

5000

606.33

604.386

Independent wealth W

131

0

1

.06

.240

Independent wealth H

132

0

1

.11

.319

Valuable assets (more than
$100K)

134

0

1

.22

.418

Joint Legal Custody (1=yes)

139

0

1

.90

.302

Physical Custody
Arrangement(1=W, 0=H)

137

0

2

.89

.354

Physical custody less than 30%
for non-custodial (1=yes)

131

0

1

.31

.462
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Child Support Deviation (actual
awarded, $/month)

111

0

5000

504.63

590.875

Automatic Adjustment-Kid's Age
(1=yes)

132

0

1

.86

.352

Automatic Adjustment-Income
(1=yes)

131

0

1

.38

.488

College Expenses (1=yes)

135

0

1

.27

.448

Alimony (1=yes)

139

0

1

.08

.271

Method of Resolution
(1=stipulation)

141

0

1

.88

.327

Allegations of Abuse
(1=allegation)

141

0

1

.14

.350

Disposition of Marital Home
(0=to one; 1=equal)

88

0

1

.24

.429

Complicated Visitation Schedule
(number of paragraphs)

139

0

21

5.31

4.614

Limitation on Removing Kids from
State (1=yes)

140

0

1

.28

.450

Religious Education/Observances
(1=mentioned)

140

0

1

.21

.412

Post-contract litigation (prior to
divorce--temporary support or
custody (1=yes)

141

0

15

1.58

2.211

Post-divorce litigation (1=yes)

141

0

1

.65

.480

How many post-divorce (motions,
hearings, etc.)

141

0

13

1.96

2.455

Consensual modifications

141

0

3

.30

.557

Ongoing business/partnership

141

0

1

.06

.232

Date Stipulation Signed

139

12/29/1997

08/30/2001

03/31/1999

06/16/1583

Date Stipulation Entered

141

01/06/1998

09/05/2001

04/16/1999

06/19/1583

Length of Marriage
(years & fraction)

135

.45

31.29

10.9927

6.90206

Age of wife at time of marriage

133

2.47

50.05

23.1445

9.55178

resolut=1 (FILTER)

141

0

1

.88

.327

Difference between H and W
income

116

-136448.00

221477.00

13737.6205

37188.72290

Predicted probability that has
adjustment for income

107

.02970

.86215

.4106159

.20580923

Valid N (listwise)

0
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Table II. Comparison of Litigate and Settle Groups
Comparison of Litigate and Settle
Groups

Petitioner (w=1)

method of
resolution (1=
stipulation)

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

0

12

0.83

0.389

0.112

1

95

0.77

0.424

0.044

0

17

32.0588

7.33545

1.77911

1

121

34.3058

6.88458

0.62587

0

16

33.3125

7.79503

1.94876

1

120

36.175

7.41072

0.6765

0

16

3.3125

3.49702

0.87426

1

119

3.3193

3.20205

0.29353

0

16

4.0625

2.46221

0.61555

1

114

3.9035

2.77463

0.25987

0

12

2.1667

1.85047

0.53418

1

82

2.7805

1.79178

0.19787

0

6

1.8333

1.16905

0.47726

1

51

2.2549

1.73024

0.24228

0

17

1.65

1.057

0.256

1

123

1.76

0.714

0.064

0

17

1992.29

4.524

1.097

1

124

1990.08

4.966

0.446

0

16

0.38

0.5

0.125

1

121

0.43

0.497

0.045

0

17

0.35

0.493

0.119

1

123

0.15

0.355

0.032

0

16

16569.13

8962.35

2240.587

1

102

25255.31

20596.347

2039.342

0

15

36464.61

31413.775

8111.002

1

102

37904.85

40430.123

4003.179

0

16

577.96

545.498

136.374

1

99

610.92

615.81

61.891

0

17

0

0

0

1

114

0.07

0.257

0.024

0

17

0.12

0.332

0.081

1

115

0.11

0.318

0.03

0

17

0.12

0.332

0.081

1

117

0.24

0.429

0.04

Age of Wife

Age of Husband

Age Difference

Attorney's cases for W in sample

Attorney's cases for H in sample
More experienced attorney (abs 1113)
Number of Children

Age of Child1 (Year of Birth)

Sex of Child 1 (1=girl)
Fault grounds? (1=abuse, 2=child
abuse, 3=adultery)
Income W ($/year)

Income H ($/year)

Guidelines Figure ($/month)

Independent Wealth W

Independent Wealth H

Valuable Assets (more than $100K)
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0

17

0.88

0.332

0.081

1

122

0.9

0.299

0.027

0

17

0.35

0.493

0.119

1

120

0.22

0.414

0.038

Physical Custody Arrangement(1=W,
0=H)

0

17

1

0

0

1

120

0.87

0.375

0.034

Physical custody less than 30% for
non-custodial (1=yes)

0

17

0.53

0.514

0.125

1

114

0.27

0.447

0.042

Child Support Deviation (Actual
awarded, $/month)

0

13

548.99

395.904

109.804

1

98

498.74

613.38

61.961

Automatic Adustment-Kid's Age
(1=yes)

0

17

0.76

0.437

0.106

1

115

0.87

0.338

0.032

Automatic Adjustment-Income
(1=yes)

0

17

0.24

0.437

0.106

1

114

0.4

0.493

0.046

0

17

0.24

0.437

0.106

1

113

0.19

0.391

0.037

0

17

0.06

0.243

0.059

1

115

0.23

0.42

0.039

0

17

0

0

0

1

118

0.31

0.466

0.043

0

17

0.59

0.507

0.123

1

121

0.64

0.481

0.044

0

17

0.18

0.393

0.095

1

122

0.07

0.249

0.023

Dependency Exemptions (1=H,
0=split, 3=W)

0

16

0.38

0.5

0.125

1

120

0.33

0.524

0.048

Disposition of Marital Home (0=to
one; 1=equal)

0

8

0.13

0.354

0.125

1

80

0.25

0.436

0.049

0

17

0.06

0.243

0.059

1

124

0.17

0.377

0.034

Complicated Visitation Schedule
(number of paragraphs)

0

17

4.24

3.401

0.825

1

122

5.46

4.75

0.43

Limitation on Removing Kids from
State (1=yes)

0

17

0.24

0.437

0.106

1

123

0.28

0.453

0.041

Religious Education/Observances
(1=mentioned)

0

17

0.12

0.332

0.081

1

123

0.23

0.421

0.038

0

17

3.24

2.728

0.662

Joint Legal Custody (1=yes)

Attorney's Fees (0=each party)

Other automatic adjustments (1=yes)

Non-Automatic Adjustments (1=yes)

College Expenses (1=yes)

Life Insurance (1=yes)

Alimony (1=yes)

Divided IRA

Post-contract litigation (prior to
divorce--temporary support or
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Post-divorce litigation (1=yes)
How many post-divorce (motions,
hearings, etc)
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1

124

1.35

2.041

0.183

0

17

0.94

0.243

0.059

1

124

0.6

0.491

0.044

0

17

4.59

3.554

0.862

1

124

1.6

2.032

0.182

0

17

0.12

0.332

0.081

1

124

0.32

0.578

0.052

0

17

0.12

0.332

0.081

1

124

0.05

0.215

0.019

0

0(a)

.

.

.

1

0(a)

.

.

.

0

17

8.1876

5.77772

1.4013

1

118

11.3969

6.97762

0.64234

0

17

0.0375

0.15071

0.03655

1

122

0.056

0.10924

0.00989

0

17

23.4402

8.97027

2.17561

1

116

23.1011

9.67024

0.89786

0

15

19657.5467

37265.50561

9621.91217

1

101

12858.4236

37282.6129

3709.75864

Consensual modifications

Ongoing business/partnership

Ongoing Tax Issues

Length of Marriage (years & fraction)

Time lapse between agreement and
divorce
Age of wife at time of marriage

Difference between H and W income

Table III. Predicting Fault (Abuse of Spouse or Child, Adultery seen in file)
Predicting Fault (Abuse of Spouse or Child, Adultery seen in File)
B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

RELIGIOU

1.623

.599

7.333

1

.007

5.070

AGEDIFF

.109

.082

1.745

1

.187

1.115

1.102
.483

4.173
22.456

1
1

.041
.000

.105
.102

ASSETS
-2.251
Constant
-2.287
Cox & Snell R2=.119
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Table IV. Predicting Provision Specifying Automatic Adjustment of Child
Support Based Upon Income (Logistic Regression)
Predicting Provision Specifying Automatic Adjustment
Upon Income
Variable
B
Std. Error B
Number of Cases in Samples
.294
.089
for Wife’s Attorney
Fault Ground
-1.506
.718
Independent Wealth of Wife
-1.656
.960
(Constant)
-1.193
.401
Cox & Snell R2 =.166

of Child Support Based
Beta

T

Sig. T

10.856

1

.001

4.403
2.974
8.837

1
1
1

.036
.085
.003

Table V. Predicting Number of Consensual Modifications, with Automatic
Adjustment of Child Support Based on Income Endogenous88
Predicting Number of Consensual Modifications, 2SLS
(Automatic Adjustment Based on Income)
Variable
B
SE B
Predicted Probability of
.601581
.322670
Provision that Child Support
Adjusted for Income Variation
Continuing Business or
2.275271
1.138764
Partnership
Number of Children
.200629
.086073
(Constant)
-.378783
.214621
System R2 = .337; R2 for Equation (Adjusted) =.088.

Beta
.200769

T
1.864

Sig T
.0651

.872611

1.998

.0484

.240820

2.331
-1.765

.0217
.0805

88 Instrumental variables are number of cases for wives handled by wife’s attorney, fault
grounds, independent wealth of wife and number of children.

DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1007

Brought to you by | University of Notre Dame
Authenticated | 129.74.89.102
Download Date | 10/14/13 10:35 AM

268 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS

1:2, 2005

Table VI. Prediction of Provision Specifying Adjustment Based Upon Age
of Child (Logistic)
Prediction of Provision Specifying Age-Based Adjustment
Variable Name
B
S.E. Wald
Dollar Deviation from Child
.006
.002 9.819
Support Guidelines
Difference Between Husband’s
.000
.000 1.453
and Wife’s Income
Constant
.091
.551 .027
Cox & Snell R2 = .145

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

1

.002

1.006

1

.228

1.000

1

.869

1.095

Table VII. Predicted Number of Post-Divorce Litigation Events,
Adjustment Upon Age of Child Endogenous89
Predicted Number of Post-Divorce Litigation Events, 2SLS (Age-Based
Adjustment)
Variable
B
SE B
Beta
T
Predicted
-8.349066
4.521190
-.900711
Probability that
Adjustment for
Child’s Age
Number of Cases
.406455
.287559
.284257
Husband’s
Attorney Handled
for Men
(Constant)
7.707467
3.925458
System R2 =.43174; R2 for Equation (adjusted) =.13709

Sig T

-1.847

.0738

1.413

.1669

1.963

.0581

89 Instrumental variables are: fault grounds, religion provision in agreement, age of wife at
marriage, length of marriage, non-custodial parent has less than 30% time with child,
independent wealth of husband, and number of husband cases handled by attorney for husband
in sample.
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Table VIII. Predicted Number of Post-Divorce Litigation Events,
Adjustment Upon Age of Child Endogenous, Includes Child Support
Deviation90
Predicted Number of Post-Divorce Litigation Events, Adjustment Upon Age of
Child Endogenous, Includes Child Support Deviation
Variable
B
SE B
Beta
T
Sig T
Predicted Probability
-3.024042 1.864674
that Adjustment for
Child’s Age
Number of Cases
.504775
.224963
Husband’s Attorney
Handled for Men
(Constant)
3.183292
1.713702
System R2=.42469; R2 (Adjusted) =.16645

-.326239

-1.622

.1144

.353017

2.244

.0317

1.858

.0722

Table IX. Prediction of Whether or Not There was Post-Divorce Litigation
(Logistic)
Prediction of Whether or Not There was Post-Divorce Litigation

Fault Grounds
Handled by Husband’s and
Wife’s Attorneys in Sample
Provision for Automatic
Adjustment for Age
Religious Education Provision
Constant
Cox & Snell R2=.138

B
1.219

S.E.
.732

Wald
2.774

df
1

Sig.
.096

Exp(
B)
3.385

.111

.039

8.014

1

.005

1.117

-1.007

.471

4.559

1

.033

.365

-1.017

.510

3.970

1

.046

.362

.099

.391

.064

1

.801

1.104

90 Instrumental variables are fault grounds, religion provision in stipulation, age of wife at
marriage, length of marriage, non-custodial parent has less than 30% time, independent wealth of
husband, number of cases for husbands in sample handled by attorney for husband, and dollar
deviation from guidelines for child support.
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